Time to Look in the Mirror

It’s like one of those movies where the husband dies in a plane crash and the wife learns he had a secret life—another identity, a second wife and kids, etc. The world she thought she knew is turned upside down. Trust is broken. Were friends complicit in the lies or as stunned as she was? Can she ever love again? 

That’s pretty much how I feel after the last in a series of scandals emanating from my workplace, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. 

I fell head-over-heels for UNC (no pun intended) the first day I interviewed here in 1998. The grounds were gorgeous, the people were friendly, the students bright, the opportunities abundant. I am an unmitigated sports nut, so I have been in blue heaven for 13 years, even in the losing seasons. I incorporated UNC as part of my identity, proud of the work I did for my School and for other units on campus. I have a wardrobe constructed around Carolina blue. As a more cynical colleague says, I drank the Kool-Aid. 

I am not naïve to the fallibility of individuals or organizations. I have been an administrator in non-profit, academic, and public institutions. I serve as an expert witness in professional negligence cases. I write about ethics and moral courage. If anyone should have been inured to the possibilities for failure, it would have been me. So how come I am gob-smacked by the revelations this week that our VC for Advancement misused his budget for travel with his girlfriend (the parent of a famous athlete and a UNC development employee whose job the VC appeared to create)?  It’s not like this was a surprise—even people as low on the food chain as I am knew parts of this story. Maybe I am just fatigued at waking up each morning to find some new, shameful revelation about a place I love, a place I thought could do better. This drama follows a transcript scandal that followed an academic scandal that followed a football scandal. I’m not even counting the lovesick professor-turned-drug-mule scandal. 

I struggle to make sense of it and to search for an answer. There is not one bad apple to tie all of these humiliations together. There is not (I don’t think! But what do I know!?) a culture of corner-cutting and side-dealing that would have predicted these events. Campus leaders are smart, hard-working, accomplished, and dedicated to UNC. Faculty, staff, students, and alumni are not shy about speaking up about issues large and small. The checks and balances that assure integrity seem to be in place, but clearly they are not. Right now I am not equipped to deconstruct these events for any kind of useful analysis on governance and ethics or even to begin to answer the question why. It is all too close and still unfolding. I am still in the shock stage of the phases of grief, though moving quickly past denial to anger, mourning our lost reputation and my lost trust, waiting for the next shoe to drop.

Penn State/Second Mile Scandal 6.0: More on How the Good Go Bad

Last month I introduced the topic of why people of integrity sometimes do the wrong thing (or fail to do the right thing). I used as an example famed football coach Joe Paterno. After he was excoriated last week in the Freeh report on the PSU/Sandusky scandal, the late coach’s family questioned how any “sane adult” could cover up for a child molester.  Indeed. Ignorance, denial, misplaced loyalty, short-term thinking, and perceived helplessness could have all conspired in his failure. In my earlier post I discussed ignorance. Today I’ll address the others and throw in two more hypotheses as a bonus.

Denial

In this case, denial doesn’t mean denying culpability in an event. It refers to the defense mechanism wherein something is so difficult to comprehend that the individual refuses to accept the reality, even in light of overwhelming evidence. Finding that an assistant you trusted for over thirty years was using your workplace to seduce and sodomize boys could certainly qualify as information too painful for Paterno to bear.

Loyalty

            Loyalty is a great quality. It means we stick by those we care about, not just in the good times, but in the bad times, too. We may become dedicated to institutions as well as to individuals. Unfortunately, people are sometimes loyal well past the point of reason, twisting the virtue into a vice. Some remain loyal to those who misuse and abuse them. Others are so blinded by their loyalty that they cannot see the failures and fallibilities of the organization or the person they love. They double down on their dedication in the face of “attacks” from outsiders. Perhaps Joe Paterno’s devotion to Penn State or to his longtime friend distorted his judgment. His loyalty to those he knew (Sandusky, the football team, the University) was more powerful than his responsibility to nameless, faceless kids abused under his watch. 

Short-Term Thinking

            In times of emergency it is easy to focus on immediate needs at the risk of long term implications. This is even more likely when high stress and strong emotions are involved.  Scandals are usually made worse by the efforts to make them go away through lies, evasions, blame, withholding information, destroying evidence, and circling the wagons among a trusted few individuals. Such efforts to mitigate the damage preclude clear thinking, perspective taking, and consideration of the “what-ifs” that lead to rational, long-term planning. Amid the decision to close an investigation against Sandusky in 1998 without charges, PSU VP Gary Shultz asked if Sandusky’s behavior was the “opening of Pandora’s box”. In retrospect, it’s unfortunate that Shultz’s big-picture “what if” question didn’t have more influence on the decision makers.

Perceived Helplessness

            A common refrain in many of my moral courage workshops is that would-be whistleblowers fail to speak up because they think it is futile to do so. They feel powerless over longstanding corruption, entrenched interests, or people higher than them on the org chart. The Freeh investigation identified this apprehension on the part of janitor Jim Calhoun who feared losing his job if he reported observing a Sandusky sexual assault. Since the person he feared was Joe Paterno himself, it’s unlikely that Paterno was stymied by perceived helplessness. I’d suggest the coach was thwarted by the inverse—perceptions of power.

Power

            People who have possessed great power-- financial, political, social, organizational etc. are used to exercising it to meet their personal and professional ends. The risk is that it can create an illusion that the power is sufficient to contain all forms of human behavior or all types of institutional crises. Over the years Joe Paterno was able to inspire thousands of young men, vanquish competitors, evade PSU student disciplinary processes, and refuse entreaties from the University President that he resign. Perhaps these and other successes led him to believe he could compel Jerry Sandusky to cease his abusive ways or that he could contain damaging revelations. If the Freeh report is to be believed, Paterno and other PSU leaders were powerful enough to suppress disclosures about Sandusky’s abuse for over 12 years. But power has its limits. Eventually Victim 1’s mother was able to ignite the investigation that brought the whole house down.

Rationalization

            Like denial, rationalization is a defense mechanism. In this case, justification is used to tolerate (or even glorify) unacceptable feelings or actions. In the Penn State case, the failure to act on Sandusky’s behavior may have been justified by contending that it was “more humane” not to report him, that it would protect the school or the football program, even that it would spare the victims the shame of investigations and testimony. Another pernicious rationalization employed by otherwise “good” people is that a bad act isn’t of the magnitude to undo their overall virtuous self-image. (For more on this principle, see research by Dan Ariely in his book The (Honest) Truth About Dishonesty).    

So, why might a sane adult, widely believed to be a person of integrity, fail so badly? Clearly there are plenty of hypotheses. We must also consider the possibility that sometimes people just aren’t as good as they (or their PR machines) portray them to be. The “dark side’ of Joe Paterno is revealed in Vicky Triponey’s accounts of his treatment of her while she was a VP at Penn State. Maybe this “dark side” is just the occasional lapse of an otherwise exceptional human, or maybe it is really the defining characteristic of that person. Either way, we’re wise to follow the caution offered in Samuel Johnson’s novel, Rasselas, which is, ironically, set in The Happy Valley. "Be not too hasty ... to trust, or to admire, the teachers of morality; they discourse like angels, but they live like men."

Penn State/Second Mile Scandal 5.0: The Freeh Report

This morning, former FBI Director Louis Freeh issued the findings of his investigation into Penn State’s handling of sex abuse complaints involving former football coach Jerry Sandusky.  The 267 page report concluded that “the most senior leaders at Penn State” demonstrated “total and consistent disregard for the safety and welfare of Sandusky’s child victims.” These four “powerful people” (President Graham Spanier, Senior VP Gary Schultz, Athletic Director Time Curley and Head Football Coach Joe Paterno) “failed to protect against a child sexual predator harming children for over a decade”, concealing “Sandusky’s activities from the Board of Trustees, the University community, and authorities”, exhibiting a “striking lack of empathy for the victims”… “in order to avoid the consequences of bad publicity”.

The report criticizes the PSU Board’s failure to exercise oversight, create a climate that fostered accountability, have procedures or structures to address organizational risks, and make reasonable inquiries into the matter when it was reported in local news in March 2011. The Board was found to be “over-confident in Spanier’s abilities to handle crises and was unprepared to deal with the filing of criminal charges against University officials in November, 2011… and the firing of Coach Paterno.”

“From 1998-2011, Penn State’s ‘Tone at the Top’ for transparency, compliance, police reporting and child protection was completely wrong, as shown by the inaction and concealment on the part of its most senior leaders , and followed by those at the bottom of the university’s pyramid of power. This is best reflected by the janitor’s decision not to report Sandusky’s horrific 2000 sexual assault of a young boy in the Lasch Building shower. The janitors were afraid of being fired for reporting a powerful football coach.”

It cites former President Spanier for “discouraging discussion and dissent” and notes a “lack of awareness of child abuse issues, the Clery Act, and whistleblower policies and protections”. (The 1990 Clery Act involves campus security policies and the reporting of crime statistics). The football program enjoyed an elite status on campus and “didn’t fully participate in, or opted out of, some university programs, including Clery Act compliance”.

The report concludes with 120 recommendations involving structures, policies and procedures to protect children, increase legal and regulatory compliance, strengthen the Board and improve administrative processes. It notes, however, that the largest and perhaps most difficult change involved that of culture “that contributed to the failure of Penn state’s most powerful leaders to adequately report and respond to the actions of a serial sexual predator.” While the University’s culture has many laudable aspects such as collegiality, high standards of educational and research excellence, the report notes “an over emphasis on ‘The Penn State Way’ as an approach to decision making, as resistance to seeking outside perspectives, and an excessive focus on athletics that can, if not recognized, negatively impact the University’s reputation as a progressive institution.” PSU should engage stakeholders, peer institutions, and outside experts in ethics and communications to conduct a review of its culture, which “may well demand further changes” at the University.    

The Freeh report is painstakingly constructed and painful to read. It offers a cautionary tale for all of us involved in organizational governance. Fortunately though, it also offers a blueprint for strengthening institutions and mitigating future risk.

Penn State/Second Mile Scandal 4.0: The Failings of Good People

In my office I have a Penn State hat signed by the school’s famed late coach, Joe Paterno. My parents gave it to me, having received it at a corporate leadership conference at which JoePa was a featured speaker. His topic was integrity, and for many he epitomized the concept. The Penn State football uniforms were decidedly old school – no player names on the back, no decals on the helmets signifying interceptions, hits, or other performance targets. The coach disdained post-play showboating by team members – why should a player celebrate something he was supposed to have been doing in the first place? Devout Catholics, Paterno and his wife lived simply and behaved humbly. They contributed to the well-being of the community and University, co-chairing the capital campaign for a new library and donating a million dollars for a new hospital wing. Graduation rates of football players under Paterno were above the national average and he was known as a mentor who emphasized citizenship and integrity among his players. His abrupt firing in the wake of the Sandusky sex abuse scandal led to student revolt and enduring efforts to clear his name.

How can someone so roundly recognized as a person of integrity fail so spectacularly? And, if it can happen to him, can it happen to any of us?

Although the answers are speculative, they are worth considering. Good people fail because they aren’t as good as their image suggests. They also fail because of ignorance, denial, misplaced loyalty, short-term thinking, and perceived helplessness. I’ll address these features in this and upcoming blogs. First, some caveats: 1) my closest connection to Joe Paterno is the hat in my office, so I rely on the reports of others for insight into the man and his actions. Those sources may or may not be honest and valid, though I do the best I can to weed out overly biased accounts in either direction. 2) In the big scheme of the Penn State/Second Mile scandal, Joe Paterno is a very minor character (albeit the best known). Jerry Sandusky has been convicted on 45 counts of crimes against children, two PSU officials are charged with perjury, civil suits are lining up on behalf of victims, and investigations are underway concerning the two organizations involved. There are plenty of failures worth examining, and I likely will do so as the cases unfold. For now, though, I will focus on Paterno, whose outcome was so greatly at odds with his image. Let’s start with a recap of the case.

Case Review

On February 9, 2001, assistant coach Mike McQueary went to Paterno’s home and revealed that he had observed sexual abuse of a youngster by Sandusky in Penn State facilities the evening before. (The exact language McQueary used is in contention, with some suggesting that he wasn’t explicit in his explanation to his elderly mentor, and others maintaining that the message was sufficiently clear). Paterno reported it to his supervisor, Athletic Director Tim Curley, and appeared to leave it in his hands. Ultimately, with the consent of the University President, the leaders merely forbade Sandusky future access to PSU facilities. In November, 2012, grand jury findings alleged years of sexual abuse by Sandusky, including at least four cases that occurred following the 2001 case. Joe Paterno told the PSU Board that he would resign at the end of the football season but was fired immediately, as was PSU President Graham Spanier.

At least part of the continuing outrage at Paterno’s termination is based on the belief that he was made the scapegoat for the failings of his superiors. Many contend that he did what was right in reporting it and had no legal or organizational responsibility to pursue it further. Others feel he had a moral responsibility to assure that proper steps were taken, in light of his power and position and the victimization of vulnerable youths. The Coach himself said in November, "This is a tragedy". "It is one of the great sorrows of my life. With the benefit of hindsight, I wish I had done more." Recent developments in the case suggest that Paterno did continue to be involved beyond his initial report to Curley, and that his actions contributed to the cover-up. Reports released yesterday reveal that administrators initially agreed upon a three-step remedy to the assault, including confronting Sandusky and banning him from campus, notifying The Second Mile charity, and reporting the case to child welfare authorities. Following a meeting with Paterno, the third step of the plan was dropped. The leaders suggested they would encourage Sandusky to get professional help and that this would constitute “a more humane and upfront way to handle” it.

Whether the errors were in what he did or what he failed to do, the roots of Paterno’s lapse of integrity are germane to all of us. For starters, perhaps he could have done better if he had known more.  

Failure of Knowledge

            Though school administrators and teachers are mandated reporters in Pennsylvania, college coaches are not. Nevertheless, anyone is entitled to report their suspicions of abuse or neglect to child protective services. Child abuse was probably not a common part of Joe Paterno’s lexicon or life experience. The coach admits as much in a January 2012 interview with The Washington Post. “I didn’t know exactly how to handle it and I was afraid to do something that might jeopardize what the university procedure was,” he said. “So I backed away and turned it over to some other people, people I thought would have a little more expertise than I did. It didn’t work out that way.”

Despite the widespread publicity about pedophilia in the Catholic Church, the notion of sodomy was even more difficult for the 85 year old to reckon with. In addressing the ambiguity over McQueary’s report to him, he told the Post, “You know, he didn’t want to get specific,” Paterno said. “And to be frank with you I don’t know that it would have done any good, because I never heard of, of, rape and a man. So I just did what I thought was best. I talked to people that I thought would be, if there was a problem, that would be following up on it.”

In addition to the lack of knowledge about procedures for addressing abuse and the harm such abuse causes victims, Coach Paterno and the PSU administrators also appear to have lacked knowledge of the characteristics of pedophilia. A stern talking to or a close call with reporting is insufficient to curb the assaults. Sandusky’s continued exploitation of youth following the 1998 investigation serves as evidence of that.

            There are many remedies for failures of knowledge: to be aware, to learn more, to avoid willful ignorance, and to seek out those who can educate us when we ourselves lack the knowledge to act.

Coming up in the next blog, the powerful combination of denial and loyalty.